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InTroduCTIon
The current outbreak of Ebola virus disease 
(EVD) in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) is the second largest in history. 
Only the 2014–2016 West African EVD 
outbreak has exceed it. The current outbreak 
is characterised by community mistrust, 
opposition to vaccination and treatment, and 
ongoing conflict in the region. The combina-
tion of these factors has meant that, despite 
the best efforts of the WHO, the DRC govern-
ment and aid agencies in the region, cases 
and deaths continue to grow on a weekly 
basis. The severity of the outbreak, as well as 
the potential for cross-border spread has led 
to a number of calls for the WHO to declare 
the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC) under the 
International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 
2005). It is hoped that such a declaration 
would instigate the delivery of badly needed 
resources to contain the outbreak. Despite 
this, no PHEIC declaration has been forth-
coming.
Ebola, ThE drC and ThE EmErgEnCy 
CommITTEE (EC) proCEss
Under the IHR 2005, the WHO Director-Gen-
eral is empowered to declare a PHEIC. In 
making this determination though, the Direc-
tor-General is required to take into account a 
number of factors including the risk to human 
health, the risk of international spread and 
the advice of a technical expert committee—
the IHR EC.1 Each EC is convened by the 
Director-General with its membership drawn 
from a list of technical experts that have been 
preapproved and recommended by govern-
ments. Importantly, however, ECs are not 
standing committees; they are assembled on 
ad hoc basis with each committee’s member-
ship purposively selected according to aeti-
ological agent involved (if known) and/or 
nature of the event. Once convened, the EC 
reviews all available data on the event and 
then advises the Director-General whether 
the conditions for a PHEIC have been met. 
If the EC ascertains the conditions have been 
met, the committee is required to provide 
recommendations on what actions the Direc-
tor-General and Member States should take 
to address the crisis.
The requirement for the Director-General 
to take advice from an independent technical 
expert group in determining a PHEIC was a 
new addition to the revised IHR 2005 frame-
work. Its creation reflected Member States’ 
discomfort over the level of autonomy exhib-
ited by the WHO Secretariat in declaring a 
global health emergency during the 2003 
SARS outbreak. Crucially, however, the role 
of the IHR EC is to conduct a technical assess-
ment of a public health crisis using a prede-
termined algorithm and legal criteria and, on 
the basis of that technical assessment, recom-
mend whether a PHEIC should be declared 
or not.
In the context of the current EVD outbreak 
in the DRC, the IHR EC has been convened 
on two ocassions - in October 2018,2 and 
again in April 2019.3 The IHR EC has advised 
against declaring a PHEIC, despite the 
criteria for doing so appearing to be met 
on both ocassions. By the Committee’s own 
acknowledgement the on-the-ground situa-
tion has substantially worsened - a situation 
corroborated by several other sources. On 
8 March 2019 for instance, Médecins Sans 
Frontières warned of a ‘toxic’ environment 
and ‘a climate of deepening community 
mistrust’.4 Within days, an attack on an Ebola 
clinic forced its temporary closure after a 
policeman was killed and a healthcare worker 
was wounded, but similar attacks targeting 
healthcare clinics had been underway for 
several months.5 By late March, an in-depth 
study confirmed that widespread community 
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distrust was hampering efforts to contain the outbreak, 
with many refusing vaccination, hiding symptoms and 
refusing treatment, even as the number of confirmed 
cases exceeded one thousand.6
Given the criteria for declaring a PHEIC appeared to 
have been met at the October 2018 IHR EC meeting, ques-
tions have arisen as to why no declaration was made then. 
It is even more perplexing that the IHR EC’s recommen-
dation remains unchanged at the conlusion of its April 
2019 meeting. This confusion has not been made easier 
by the fact the rationale provided at the October 2018 
meeting for why a PHEIC was unjustified was not espe-
cially clear, only that ‘a PHEIC should not be declared 
at this time’.7 This language of this statement was mark-
edly different from the language of past ECs that recom-
mended a PHEIC should not be declared. Indeed, in 
the 13 previous instances of an EC recommending that a 
PHEIC ought not be declared, every previous committee 
stated, ‘the conditions for a PHEIC are not currently met’ 
or the event ‘does not constitute a PHEIC’. The October 
2018 meeting is the only time an EC has deviated from this 
standard terminology. While not conclusive, it is sugges-
tive the IHR EC’s advice was not based on PHEIC criteria 
alone but that other factors may also have been consid-
ered. Likewise, at the April 2019 meeting, the IHR EC 
advised against a PHEIC being declared because, in the 
committee’s view, ‘there is no added benefit to declaring 
a PHEIC at this stage’, and they further noted there has 
yet to be ‘international spread’ beyond the borders of 
the DRC.3 This is despite the fact that they acknowledged 
the ‘very high risk of regional spread’, the ongoing and 
complex nature of the current outbreak, the ‘recent 
increase in transmission in specific areas’ and the ‘critical 
need to strengthen current efforts in both preparedness 
and response’.3 Indeed, the notion of ‘added benefit’ is 
not part of the PHEIC criteria laid down in the Interna-
tional Health Regulations, and as such is superfluous to 
the treaty’s established legal requirements. These two 
statements naturally raise questions about how an EC 
arrives at its recommendations and the transparency of 
that deliberation process.
ThE ImporTanCE of TransparEnCy
Concerns about the transparency of IHR EC processes 
and decision making are not new. Until relatively recently, 
even the names of IHR EC members were not publicly 
known or shared. While this policy was changed in 2011,8 
on the basis that ‘The Organization […] recognized that 
it requires greater transparency to maintain the trust of 
the public’ (WHO, p 119),8 that is currently the limit of 
transparency in IHR EC deliberations. Given the crucial 
role the EC plays in determining whether a PHEIC ought 
to be declared, coupled with the central importance of 
the PHEIC declaration for responding to health crises 
(including pandemics), we argue any concerns regarding 
the transparency of IHR EC processes undermines the 
decisions reached, the legitimacy of those decisions and 
their processes and, by association, the IHR 2005 and the 
treaty’s custodian, the WHO.
Transparency is widely considered to be central to good 
governance. Transparency ensures accountability,9 and 
both validates and defends the legitimacy of the processes 
followed and decisions made and the actors involved in 
the decision-making process.10 As the International Law 
Association in its Study on the Accountability of Inter-
national Organizations observed, ‘transparency in…the 
decision-making process and the implementation of…
decisions’ as well as ‘access to information open to all 
potentially concerned and/or affected by the decisions 
at stake’ is constitutive of the ‘principle of good gover-
nance’.11 It is for these very reasons that various interna-
tional organisations, including the United Nations (UN), 
have repeatedly sought to embrace increased transpar-
ency in decision making.
alTErnaTIvEs To ThE CurrEnT modEl
The UN Security Council (UNSC) has the primary 
responsibility for international peace and security in 
international law. Despite the highly sensitive nature of 
the Security Council deliberations, the Council normally 
meets and makes decisions in public along with a live 
webcast, verbatim records of statements made during 
the deliberation process, and evidence taken are kept 
and published on the UNSC website. Indeed, even 
some private meetings that the Council holds are offi-
cially recorded, although with no verbatim record and 
fewer details logged, as per the Rules of Procedure of 
the Council.12 While concerns the UNSC lacks transpar-
ency in some of its work have been raised, particularly 
around the use of ‘Arria-Formula’ meetings, the Security 
Council model does contain important lessons for future 
reform of the IHR EC process. Moving towards a greater 
transparency of the IHR ECs, including live webcast of 
the meetings and publishing a verbatim record of the 
discussion in all official UN working languages would, in 
our view, increase the transparency and legitimacy of the 
work of the Committee, its decisions and, by implication, 
the legitimacy of the International Health Regulations.
Having said this, we acknowledge there are times when 
security-sensitive information warrants increased discre-
tion. Both DRC EC meetings heard evidence from the 
Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secre-
tary-General on the work of the United Nations Organi-
zation Stabilization Mission in the Demoratic Republic 
ofthe Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Peacekeeping 
mission in the DRC, including its logistics and secu-
rity activities in the DRC, provides one example where 
elements of an IHR EC’s deliberations may require censor-
ship. This process can be managed, however, while still 
promoting transparency around IHR EC deliberations 
more broadly. For instance, any evidence or discussion 
that alludes to information that could place healthcare 
workers in danger, such as the location and movement 
of healthcare workers or the security services in a region, 
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could be managed whereby the live feed is temporarily 
halted and the information redacted from the verbatim 
record. This will allow frank and open discussion of 
health concerns in a complex conflict zone, such as the 
DRC, while ensuring the overall decision-making process 
remains transparent and legitimate.
ConClusIon
Until there is increased transparency around EC Delib-
erations, questions about irrelevant considerations, 
undue influence and political interference will continue 
to arise. These concerns can be easily addressed given 
existing information technology capabilities, and inter-
ventions such as live streaming IHR EC discussions and 
verbatim records will provide the entire international 
community with critical insights into how a public health 
crisis is unfolding and what the WHO is doing to contain 
it. This is a simple change to existing WHO practices that 
is long overdue, and in so doing, it will alleviate ongoing 
concerns about how EC members arrive at their deci-
sions and strengthen the legitimacy of the WHO, which 
is charged with protecting the international community 
against the spread of disease.
Contributors Both authors contributed jointly to the production of this manuscript.
The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding 
agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests None declared.
patient consent for publication Not required.
provenance and peer review Commissioned; internally peer reviewed.
data availability statement No additional data are available.
open access This is an open access article distributed in accordance with the 
Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 4.0) license, which 
permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, 
and license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original work is 
properly cited, appropriate credit is given, any changes made indicated, and the 
use is non-commercial. See: http:// creativecommons. org/ licenses/ by- nc/ 4. 0/.
REfEREncEs
 1. International Health Regulations. Article 12 2005;4.
 2. WHO. Statement on the October 2018 meeting of the IHR 
emergency Committee on the Ebola virus disease outbreak in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. World Health organization, 17 
October 2018. Available: https://www. who. int/ news- room/ detail/ 
17- 10- 2018- statement- on- the- meeting- of- the- ihr- emergency- 
committee- on- the- ebola- outbreak- in- drc [Accessed 14 Jan 2019].
 3. World Health Organisation. Statement on the Meeting of the 
international health regulations (2005) emergency Committee for 
Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 
12th April, 2019. Available: https://www. who. int/ news- room/ detail/ 
12- 04- 2019- statement- on- the- meeting- of- the- international- health- 
regulations-( 2005)- emergency- committee- for- ebola- virus- disease- 
in- the- democratic- republic- of- the- congo- on- 12th- april- 2019 
[Accessed 16 Apr 2019].
 4. Child D. ‘Toxic’ atmosphere undermining DRC Ebola outbreak 
response: MSF. Al Jazeera, 2019. Available: https://www. aljazeera. 
com/ news/ 2019/ 03/ toxic- atmosphere- undermining- drc- ebola- 
outbreak- response- msf- 190307142358603. html [Accessed 4 Apr 
2019].
 5. Anonymous. ‘It breaks my heart’: WHO chief decries raid on DRC 
Ebola centre. Al Jazeera, 2019. Available: https://www. aljazeera. 
com/ news/ 2019/ 03/ breaks- heart- chief- decries- raid- drc- ebola- 
centre- 190309193641595. html [Accessed 4 Apr 2019].
 6. Anonymous. Community mistrust worsening DR Congo Ebola 
outbreak: study. al Jazeera, 2019. Available: https://www. aljazeera. 
com/ news/ 2019/ 03/ community- mistrust- worsening- dr- congo- ebola- 
outbreak- study- 190328062938247. html [Accessed 4 Apr 2019].
 7. WHO. 17 October 2018.
 8. WHO. Implementation of the International Health Regulations 
(2005) - Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of 
the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 (2011) A64/10, 2019. Available: http:// apps. who. int/ gb/ 
ebwha/ pdf_ files/ WHA64/ A64_ 10- en. pdf
 9. Grigorescu A. Transparency of Intergovernmental organizations: 
the roles of member States, International Bureaucracies and 
nongovernmental organizations. International Studies Quarterly 
2007;51:625–48.
 10. Hovell D. The Deliberative Deficit: Transparency, Access to 
Information and UN Sanctions. In: Farrall JM, Rubenstein K, eds. 
Sanctions, accountability and governance in a globalized world. 99. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
 11. International Law Association. Report of the Seventy-First 
conference. 172. London: International Law Association, 2004.
 12. United Nations Security Council. Provisional ROP in un doc S/96/
Rev.7. Geneva: United Nations, 1982.
 o
n
 29 April 2019 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001618 on 25 April 2019. Downloaded from 
